After the 1990 census, the North Carolina General Assembly was entitled to a 12th seat in the U.S. House of Representatives and redrew its congressional districts to account for the changes in population. In the present case, the facts could sustain no such allegation. North Carolina's decision to create a majority-minority district can be explained as an attempt to meet this objection. Justia makes no guarantees or warranties that the annotations are accurate or reflect the current state of law, and no annotation is intended to be, nor should it be construed as, legal advice. The District Court below relied on these portions of UJO to reject appellants' claim. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. Connor, supra, at 425. v. EVAN MILLIGAN, ET AL. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 752, n. 18 (1973)-but because they are objective factors that may serve to defeat a claim that a district has been gerrymandered on racial lines. Two others concluded that the statute did not minimize or cancel out a minority group's voting strength and that the State's intent to comply with the Voting Rights Act, as interpreted by the Department of Justice, "foreclose[d] any finding that [the State] acted with the invidious purpose of discriminating against white voters." Why did four justices in this case dissent from majority opinion? Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 144 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Wright illustrates the difficulty of determining from the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distinguishes between voters on the basis of race. Wygant v. Jackson Bd. v. Bakke, 438 U. S. 265, 304-305 (1978) (Powell, J.) Appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief against the state appellees. to Juris. Redistricters have to justify themselves. Because the holding is limited to such anomalous circumstances, ante, at 649, it perhaps will not substantially hamper a State's legitimate efforts to redistrict in favor of racial minorities. For much of our Nation's history, that right sadly has been denied to many because of race. Ruth Shaw and four other white North Carolina voters filed suit against the U.S. attorney general and various North Carolina officials, claiming that race-based redistricting violated, among other provisions, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Justice Department accepted this revision. Although the State argues that it had a strong basis for concluding that remedial action was warranted, only three Justices in UJO were prepared to say that States have a significant interest in minimizing the consequences of racial bloc voting apart from the Act's requirements and without regard for sound districting principles. That argument strikes a powerful historical chord: It is unsettling how closely the North Carolina plan resembles the most egregious racial gerrymanders of the past. The plan amounts to unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race 3.District 12 is not compact or contiguous which are criteria for district maps 4. Cf. c. Answer the questions in part (b) for the minimum body temperature during the 24-hour period. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. Pp. Where it exists, most often the result is that neither white nor black can be elected from a district in which his race is in the minority." The Court appears to accept this, and it does not purport to disturb the law of vote dilution in any way. The Democratic National Committee maintained that the minority districts were constitutional, while the Republican National Committee argued that they were not. Thus, we express no view as to whether "the intentional creation of majority-minority districts, without more," always gives rise to an equal protection claim. Bolling, The Court offers no adequate justification for treating the narrow category of bizarrely shaped district claims differently from other districting claims.9 The only justification I. But just because there frequently will be a constitutionally permissible use of race in electoral districting, as exemplified by the consideration of race to comply with the Voting Rights Act (quite apart from the consideration of race to remedy a violation of the Act or the Consti-. The Court today chooses not to overrule, but rather to sidestep, UJO. Drawing on the "one person, one vote" principle, this Court recognized that "[t]he right to vote can be affected by a dilution of voting power as well as by an absolute prohibition on casting a ballot.". Statement 67a-lOOa (Complaint and Motion for Preliminary Injunction and For Temporary Restraining Order). O'CONNOR, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which REHNQUIST, C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, and THOMAS, JJ., joined. 91-2038, p. 43a (Complaint in Pope v. Blue, No. It is also unnecessary to decide at this stage of the litigation whether the plan advances a state interest distinct from the Act: eradicating the effects of past racial discrimination. 21A375 is treated as a . 7, that included a second majority-black district. Laws that explicitly distinguish between individuals on racial grounds fall within the core of that prohibition. Katzenbach, Michael R. Cole, Alan E. Kraus, Laughlin McDonald, Kathy Wilde, E. Richard Larson, and Dennis Courtland Hayes; for the NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc., by Elaine R. Jones, Charles Stephen Ralston, and Dayna L. Cunningham; and for Bolley Johnson et al. Draper reviewed the receivables list from the January transactions. Whites constitute roughly 76% of the total population and 79% of the voting age population in North Carolina. See ante, at 647. Const., Amdt. To allow judicial interference whenever this occurs would be to invite constant and unmanageable intrusion. Moreover, it seems clear to us that proof sometimes will not be difficult at all. There is a characteristic coincidence of disadvantageous effect and illegitimate purpose associated with the State's use of race in those situations in which it has immediately trig-. More generally, we remarked: "The mere fact that one interest group or another concerned with the outcome of [the district's] elections has found itself outvoted and without legislative seats of its. In the meantime, our human resources manager will send you an application form. Constitution prohibits using race as the basis for how to draw districts, 1. Its central purpose is to prevent the States from purposefully discriminating between individuals on the basis of race. the purchase to her American Express card. Croson, supra, at 500 (quoting Wygant, supra, at 277 (plurality opinion)). The duty to govern impartially is abused when a group with power over the electoral process defines electoral boundaries solely to enhance its own political strength at the expense of any weaker group. Draper identified on February 15 that a customer was not going to pay his receivable of $200 from December 9. Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for federal appellees. See App. Washington v. Davis, 426 U. S. 229, 239 (1976). WHITE, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BLACKMUN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 658. If the allegation of racial gerrymandering remains uncontradicted, the District Court further must determine whether the North Carolina plan is narrowly tailored to further a compelling governmental interest. See 364 U. S., at 341, 346. Supp., at 472-473. (c) The classification of citizens by race threatens special harms that are not present in this Court's vote-dilution cases and thus warrants an analysis different from that used in assessing the validity of atlarge and multimember gerrymandering schemes. What is the purpose of an input device? by Donald B. Verrilli, Jr., Scott A. Sinder, Kevin X. Crowley, and James A. Peters. A state must prove a compelling interest in order to survive a legal challenge to the redistricting plan. Supreme Court rulings in the Shaw v. Reno (1995) and the Shelby County vs. Holder (2013) cases relied heavily on the reasoning behind the passage of the Voting Rights Act (1965). In its 1993 decision, the Supreme Court agreed, ruling that race cannot be the predominant factor in creating districts. The Constitution does not call for equal sized districts . UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of racial equality. The ruling was significant in the area of redistricting and racial gerrymandering. Ibid. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. Did North Carolina residents claim that the 1990 redistricting plan discriminated on the basis of race raise a valid constitutional issue under the 14th Amendment's Equal Protection Clause? The "historic and present condition" of the Mexican-American community, id., at 767, a status of cultural and economic marginality, id., at 768, as well as the legislature's unresponsiveness to the group's interests, id., at 768-769, justified the conclusion that MexicanAmericans were "'effectively removed from the political processes,'" and "invidiously excluded from effective participation in political life," id., at 769. Under that principle, a proposed voting change cannot be precleared if it will lead to "a retrogression in the position of racial minorities with respect to their effective exercise of the electoral franchise." App. See Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U. S., at 86-90, and nn. Nonetheless, the notion that North Carolina's plan, under which whites remain a voting majority in a disproportionate number of congressional districts, and pursuant to which the State has sent its first black representatives since Reconstruction to the United States Congress, might have violated appellants' constitutional rights is both a fiction and a departure from settled equal protection principles. For example, on remand North Carolina might claim that it adopted the revised plan in order to comply with the 5 "nonretrogression" principle. The fact that it now chooses to apply strict scrutiny when a law is meant to benefit a race that has been the subject of historical discrimination makes no sense. A covered jurisdiction's interest in creating majority-minority districts in order to comply with the nonretrogression rule under 5 of the Voting Rights Act does not give it carte blanche to engage in racial gerrymandering. Evidence of the district's shape is therefore convincing, but it is also cumulative, and, for our purposes, irrelevant. See, e. g., White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-766 (1973); Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124, 153-155 (1971). Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U. S. 30, 46-51 (1986), and as long as racial bloc voting takes place,l legislators will have to take race into account in order to avoid dilution of minority voting strength in the districting plans they adopt.2 One need look. In districting, by contrast, the mere placement of an individual in one district instead of another denies no one a right. fications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics." As we have held, one's constitutional rights are not violated merely because the candidate one supports loses the election or because a group (including a racial group) to which one belongs winds up with a representative from outside that group. Byron R. White White. See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337. Accordingly, the Court held that such schemes violate the Fourteenth Amendment when they are adopted with a discriminatory purpose and have the effect of diluting minority voting strength. To begin with, the complaint nowhere alleges any type of stigmatic harm. The district lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to maintain the integrity of political subdivisions. Id., at 56-58. Instead, the General Assembly enacted a revised redistricting plan, 1991 N. C. Extra Sess. Lacking support in any of the Court's precedents, the majority's novel type of claim also makes no sense. JUSTICE SOUTER apparently views racial gerrymandering of the type presented here as a special category of "benign" racial discrimination that should be subject to relaxed judicial review. In the example the verb is answered. can imagine would be the preservation of "sound districting principles," UJO, 430 U. S., at 168, such as compactness and contiguity. Beer v. United States, 425 U. S. 130, 141 (1976). With him on the briefs were Michael F. Easley, Attorney General of North Carolina, Edwin M. Speas, Jr., Senior, Deputy Attorney General, and Norma S. Harrell and Tiare B. Smiley, Special Deputy Attorneys General. JUSTICE SOUTER contends that exacting scrutiny of racial gerrymanders under the Fourteenth Amendment is inappropriate because reapportionment "nearly always require[s] some consideration of race for legitimate reasons." But "[a] number of states refused to take no for an answer and continued to circumvent the fifteenth amendment's prohibition through the use of both subtle and blunt instruments, perpetuating ugly patterns of pervasive racial discrimination." 430 U. S., at 155 (plurality opinion) (emphasis added). Nor, because of the distinctions between the two categories, is there any risk that Fourteenth Amendment districting law as such will be taken to imply anything for purposes of general Fourteenth Amendment scrutiny about "benign" racial discrimination, or about group entitlement as distinct from individual protection, or about the appropriateness of strict or other heightened scrutiny. On the same reasoning, I would affirm the District Court's dismissal of appellants' claim in this instance. Post, at 671 (WHITE, J., dissenting); see also post, at 684 (SOUTER, J., dissenting). Some 90 years later, Alabama redefined the boundaries of the city of Tuskegee "from a square to an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" in a manner that was alleged to exclude black voters, and only black voters, from the city limits. For the reasons that follow, we conclude that appellants have stated a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Equal Protection Clause. To comply with 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 - which prohibits a covered jurisdiction from implementing changes in a "standard, practice, or procedure with respect to voting" without federal authorization - North Carolina submitted to the Attorney General a congressional . 92-357. The shapes of the two districts in question were quite controversial. At-large and multimember schemes, however, do not classify voters on the basis of race. A. Croson Co., 488 U. S. 469, 493-495 (1989) (plurality opinion of O'CONNOR, J., joined by REHNQUIST, C. J., and WHITE and KENNEDY, JJ.) Pp. of Ed. White v. Regester, supra, at 766. An understanding of the nature of appellants' claim is critical to our resolution of the case. JOHN H. MERRILL, ALABAMA SECRETARY OF STATE, ET AL. The Attorney General's interposition of a 5 objection "properly is viewed" as "an administrative finding of discrimination" against a racial minority. Carr (1962) was a landmark case concerning re-apportionment and redistricting. Id., at 59. But in the context of a Fourteenth Amendment challenge, courts must bear in mind the difference between what the law permits and what it requires. Students in AP Gov't and Politics are required to know both cases as part of the cannon of cases and the precedents set as part of the course standards. Court's determination to depart from our prior decisions by carving out this narrow group of cases for strict scrutiny in place of the review customarily applied in cases dealing with discrimination in electoral districting on the basis of race. A special three-judge district court dismissed the suit against both the attorney general and the state officials. Get Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), United States Supreme Court, case facts, key issues, and holdings and reasonings online today. Although I disagree with the holding that appellants' claim is cognizable, the Court's discussion of the level of scrutiny it requires warrants a few comments. to Brief for Federal Appellees 16a. I doubt that this constitutes a discriminatory purpose as defined in the Court's equal protection cases-i. App. ON APPLICATIONS FOR STAYS OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF [February 7, 2022] The application for a stay or injunctive relief presented to J. USTICE . It does so by glossing over the striking similarities, focusing on surface differences, most notably the (admittedly unusual) shape of the newly created districtand imagining an entirely new cause of action. districts in order to comply with the Voting Rights Act. The General Assembly's first redistricting plan contained one majority-black district centered in that area of the State. SHAW v. RENO(1993) No. Croson Co.(1989) (city contracting);Wygant v. Jackson Bd. no further than the Voting Rights Act to understand that this may be required, and we have held that race may constitutionally be taken into account in order to comply with that Act. Racial classifications with respect to voting carry particular dangers. As long as members of racial groups have the commonality of interest implicit in our ability to talk about concepts like "minority voting strength," and "dilution of minority votes," cf. When an assumption that people in a particular minority group (whether they are defined by the political party, religion, ethnic group, or race to which they belong) will vote in a particular way is used to benefit that group, no constitutional violation occurs. See Karcher, supra, at 776 (WHITE, J., dissenting); Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U. S. 542, 554 (1969) (WHITE, J., dissenting). Pleading such an element, the Court holds, suffices without a further allegation of harm, to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under the Fourteenth Amendment. T. HOMAS. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. This small sample only begins to scratch the surface of the problems raised by the majority's test. Ruth O. Shaw (appellee) was a white Democratic resident of the 12th district in North Carolina. The voting age population of North Carolina is approximately 78% white, 20% black, and 1% Native American; the remaining 1% is predominantly Asian. The Attorney General objected to the plan on the ground that the second district could have been created to give effect to minority voting strength in the State's south-central to southeastern region. claim in UJO was that the State had "violated the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments by deliberately revising its reapportionment plan along racial lines." Supp., at 472. Our voting rights precedents support that conclusion. [W]e believe that reapportionment is one area in which appearances do matter. and by him referred to the Court in No. Regents of Univ. In a similar vein, Justice Stewart was joined by Justice Powell in stating: "The petitioners have made no showing that a racial criterion was used as a basis for denying them their right to vote, in contravention of the Fifteenth Amendment. Allen v. State Board of Elections(1969) (emphasis added). The majority found no support for appellants' contentions that race-based districting is prohibited by Article I, 4, or Article I, 2, of the Constitution, or by the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.